Tunnels and The Philadelphi Corridor

(With thanks to IDSF, Habitchonistim )

A smuggling industry with a turnover in the billions:

In recent years, smuggling from Egypt into Gaza has become central to the Gazan economy and key to the strengthening of Hamas. Even today the city of Rafah is full of smugglers, who bribe the Egyptian police and run a business sector with a turnover in the billions.

The smuggling still continues during wartime, as war materiel and other goods flow from Sinai into Gaza every day. And there is fear that such smuggling is, or will be, accompanied by smuggling in the other direction. Senior Hamas figures are likely to try to escape into Egyptian territory, with hostages, and from there to Iran.  

Control  of food distribution is to control Gaza.

Besides the problem of smuggling, absence of Israeli control at the Philadelphi Corridor also causes a severe problem of supervision over the humanitarian aid to Gaza. Since the start of the war, thousands of trucks have entered Gaza with humanitarian supplies and food. The distribution of aid is managed officially by UNRWA and by “charitable organizations,” but in practice, behind all that management, Hamas is pulling the strings. It is important to understand that as long as Hamas wields control over the supplies, they are channeled first and foremost to its own purposes, and in that way Hamas succeeds in operating more forcefully while also gaining the population’s acknowledgement of its authority.

Israel Must Defeat Hamas in Rafah

Both the history of Rafah and its current situation show that if Hamas is to be defeated as a governing body, the IDF must control the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel must have full authority over the entry of all goods into Gazan territory, and there must be a ground operation in Rafah.

Such a ground operation is indispensable, because Rafah is the last stronghold of the Hamas leadership and the only place where its battalions still are active as organized military units. Currently the Israeli public is concerned that the IDF, despite attaining many, many successes, has not laid its hands on the senior Hamas figures and has not located the hostages. The entry into Rafah will be the decisive battle, leading us to the top Hamas commanders and to their last military stronghold, and to the hostages. Therefore we must enter the city, and as promptly as possible. Contrary to the widespread conception, Rafah is not a difficult military objective. Tougher places have already been taken, so this task is certainly doable.