The Day After Hamas

 According to Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, three conditions are necessary in order to ensure that after the Hamas terror infrastructures are dismantled that no new ones can rise again in Gaza.

First, the border between Gaza and Egypt.

We need to maintain complete control over that border. When Israel did not control that border, knowledge, money, weapons and manpower flowed massively and endlessly into Gaza. This is precisely what converted Hamas from a small terror organization into the army we see today. It’s important to note that control over the border with Egypt is not merely a matter of controlling the Philadephi Corridor, but must also include control over the area deep within the Gaza Strip, which will utterly isolate Gaza from Egypt. The importance of this area is similar to the strategic concept in the Jordan Valley, where we also hold control over the border with a country with whom we have a peace agreement. It’s true, in the Jordan Valley we’re also dealing with smuggling problems, but it would be much greater if we didn’t have control.

Second, Israel must ensure that it has freedom to operate in Gaza

This in order to destroy terror infrastructures. In order to understand the significance of this condition, we need to recall the initial stage of the Oslo Agreements of 1994, which were known as “Gaza and Jericho first”. In other words, transferring the cities to the control of the Palestinian Authority. Within this framework, the IDF stopped fighting terror in these areas, and left this crucial task in the hands of the PA. The result, as we know, was that within these cities significant terror infrastructures rapidly took hold. The lesson we learned from this historical error was that we are obligated to continue operating militarily in areas with terror potential. In other words, even after the conquest of Gaza and destruction of the terror infrastructures, the IDF must maintain complete freedom of operation on a daily basis throughout the Gaza Strip.

Finally, the third condition for preventing the strengthening of terror in Gaza

This a condition linked to the second condition, is settlement. As with all regions of the country since the Second Aliyah, military and political control can only develop in areas where there is civilian settlement. The reason for this is not only that settlement and movement along arteries creates a constant state of security but also that only significant civilian settlement provides legitimation for a military presence. This, for example, is the difference between Judea and Samaria and South Lebanon. In Judea and Samaria there is an active, living texture which, on the one hand, facilitates routine and on the other, there is a military presence, while in South Lebanon the arteries were left to the terror organizations and the IDF had no clear justification to continually act and prevent terror.

The full article can be read at https://idsf.org.il/en/opinion-en/the-day-after-hamas/