BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,704, August 21, 2020
Full
article at https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-israel-uae-deal/
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The peace agreement between Israel and the
United Arab Emirates presents the Iranian regime with dilemmas on both the
foreign and the domestic front. The regime fears the emergence of a new international
alliance that will have greater power to contain its hegemonic regional
aspirations, and there is a new urgency to the need to prove to the Iranian
people that the government’s imperialist foreign policy works to their benefit.
The
prospect of such an alliance is particularly troubling to the regime at a time
when its regional status is declining. The deep crisis now engulfing Lebanon
and the Hague’s conviction of a Hezbollah member for the assassination of PM
Rafiq Hariri do not contribute to Iran’s prestige.
Another
element of the Israel-UAE deal that is causing discomfort for the Islamist
regime is the problem of how to control discourse on the subject among the
Iranian general public. The leadership is finding it difficult to explain the
emerging ties between Israel and Muslim countries to its citizens. It is
defaulting to the traditional pattern of labeling those states traitors to
Islamic values and the Palestinian cause.
This
message is not getting the traction it once did among ordinary Iranians. The
educated social stratum in Iran does not buy the argument that normalization
with Israel is a betrayal by definition. Compounding this problem, more and
more Iranians are expressing the view that the regime’s investment of resources
in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Gaza comes at their expense.
From the
mullahs’ point of view, the Israel-UAE agreement is a painful blow because it
sends a message that Muslim countries not only do not view Israel as an enemy
that must be destroyed but view it as a potential partner for mutual prosperity
and security. The Iranian people, unlike their leadership, do not believe
Egypt, Jordan, and now the UAE are traitors to Islam.
The foreign policy of the Iranian leadership is
designed to strengthen extremists at the expense of the welfare and prosperity of
the country’s own citizens. The regime has no intention of altering this
policy, and will continue to threaten other countries in the Persian Gulf that
might be considering a similar rapprochement with Jerusalem. It is possible
that Iran will now concentrate its efforts on harassing oil tankers anchored in
UAE ports.
According to media reports, Bahrain is likely to be one of the next Gulf States to advance its ties with Israel. There too, Iran’s subversion of Bahrain served as a catalyst for the Khalifa family to establish ties with Israel.
Bahrain’s
demographic structure is 70% Shiite, which rendered it, in the eyes of the
Iranian regime, fertile ground for the advancement of its revolutionary
worldview. As early as December 1981 the “Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain” tried and failed to overthrow the ruling monarchy and establish an
Iran-backed theocratic regime, and in 1996 the Bahrain authorities uncovered
another attempt by Tehran to overthrow the regime and replace it with a
theocracy according to the Velayat-e Faqih model. Iran accompanied these
subversive activities with “soft power” measures and support for opposition
organizations, and it trained militants in the emirate.
The
Iranian revolutionary model has been a threatening and destabilizing factor in
the Middle East for decades. The greater Iran’s hostility toward the countries
in the region, the greater the likelihood that they will eventually come
together in some way to oppose it.
The formation of alliances among countries experiencing
a common threat is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East. This was true six
decades ago, when the Iranian monarchy felt threatened by the spread of Arab
nationalism led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and it is true today. The expression
“The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is as valid today as it ever was, despite
attempts to throw that realpolitik model
into the so-called dustbin of history.
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