At the start of April, Hebrew media reports quoted
unnamed Israeli security officials as saying that the Iranian-backed
Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror faction, which possesses a rocket arsenal even
larger than that of Hamas, was planning a major attack on Israeli targets.
The disclosure of this information appeared to achieve
its goal of discouraging the perpetrators, and no attack transpired. But the
fact that PIJ was reportedly planning an incident that could have upset
Egyptian attempts to restore calm to the Gaza Strip could hint at a wider
struggle taking place within Gaza between Egypt and Iran.
Gaza’s ruling regime, Hamas, has reportedly faced demands from Egypt in recent months to
decide whether it “takes its orders from Tehran or continues to implement the
understandings for calm” formulated by the head of Egyptian intelligence Abbas
Kamel.
The clash of interests between these two regional
powers seems clear. Egypt wishes to see Gaza calm, stable, and cut off from
ISIS-affiliated terror networks in Sinai, which also threaten Egyptian
security; while Iran sees Gaza as one more base from which it can exercise its
radical influence and encourage the growth of a terrorist army that threatens
not only Israel but the stability of the whole region.
Iran transfers $100 million a year to the military
wings of Hamas and PIJ collectively, according to Israeli estimates.
Boaz Ganor, executive director of the International
Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya,
recalled that with the signing of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, Cairo
had no interest in retaking Gaza.
Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat “understood the
problematic nature of this territory, which is the most crowded in the world,
and racked with poverty, fundamentalism, and a lack of a sovereign ruler,” said
Ganor. As a result, Sadat did not demand a return to Egyptian rule over Gaza,
even though Egypt had controlled the Strip prior to the 1967 Six-Day War.
“What Sadat understood, [current Egyptian President
Abdel Fattah] El-Sisi also understands, although in a different manner,” Ganor
said. “Sisi understands that the Strip contains many risks to Egypt within it.
Hamas, which controls Gaza, is tied by the umbilical cord to its mother
movement – the Muslim Brotherhood – who are Sisi’s loathed strategic enemies.”
Sisi has identified a process of Iranian infiltration
into Gaza via its proxy, PIJ, “and is concerned by the growth of a forward
Iranian post on the northern border of Egypt,” said Ganor.
Another source of concern for Sisi is the fact that
ISIS in Sinai is linked to other Salafi-jihadist elements in Gaza. These
security and political factors, as well as Egyptian concern over the prospect
of a new armed conflict erupting between Israel and Hamas on Egypt’s border,
have all led to “massive Egyptian intervention and a will to be active in what
is taking place in the Strip,” said Ganor. Israel, for its part, is in favor of
this intervention and has even requested it over the years.
Iran is trying to neutralize Egyptian influence in
Gaza, Ganor noted, while looking to tighten its links with its Gazan proxies.
Tehran is trying to transfer funds and weapons into Gaza. “It also seeks to
instruct its proxies to disrupt every process that can lead to calm,” said
Ganor.
Tehran’s relationship with Hamas is somewhat
complicated.
According to Ganor, “Iran’s influence on Hamas is
significant, but much smaller than its influence on Hezbollah. Hamas zealously
safeguards its independence and does not view itself as being obligated to
Iranian interests.”
With Iran conducting training sessions for PIJ inside
the Islamic Republic, the organization is an “explicit proxy of Iran, in
contrast to Hamas, which is under Iranian influence but has its own agenda and
is more independent,” he argued.
Egypt has far more at stake in Gaza, which is at its
back door. “Whatever happens in Sinai directly influences Egypt. Iran,
meanwhile, is distant, and tries to activate its influence in Gaza by remote
control,” said Segall.
He summed up the Iranian proxy strategy as follows:
“The more Israel bleeds on its borders, the less it can engage Iran directly.”
And the Iranians would like the same thing to happen in the West Bank, with
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calling for terror factions there
to be armed just as they are in Gaza.
“This is central component in Iranian doctrine. It’s
about asymmetric warfare. Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria have become part of Iran’s
asymmetric warfare doctrine,” said Segall. “The Iranians work with a proxy
toolbox against the Saudis, the Egyptians and Gulf states. This is not limited
to Gaza,” he said.
While Iran has the power to activate PIJ to disrupt
Egyptian mediation efforts or spark a new conflict, PIJ also faces pressure
from Hamas, which can force its will on it, including through the force of
arms, according to Segall.
“I think that on the day they receive their orders from
Iran, PIJ will obey and cash its checks, which it has received over the years
from the Iranians,” he said.
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