On May 13, 2018, around 9pm, an
explosion was heard in one of the communities on the Gaza border. Residents who
came out of their homes found on their front lawn two explosive devices
attached to something that appeared to be a small parachute, white and square.
One of the devices exploded, but didn't cause any damage.
Security forces that
arrived at the town gathered the findings, but couldn't explain at the time how
and where did they come from.
Several days later a similar
device was once again discovered on the outskirts of that town, which is
located across the border from Gaza City. This time, security forces could
point to a connection between the explosive devices and a drone coming from the
strip.
After the third time that month
that a drone infiltrated this town, it likely did not make its way back, and
went down on the way. The IDF didn't report to the public about this incident,
and to this day it only has vague comments to offer on it, despite the fact the
findings collected from the front lawn that first time were presented to some
of the town's residents.
The IDF doesn't know how many
explosive-carrying drones were sent over the last year from the Gaza Strip, how
many of them made it back in one piece, and whether this is the harbinger of
what's to come in the next round of fighting—waves of explosive drones. But the
working assumption in the Southern Command is that Hamas does have the
capability to operate dangerous drones.
Two months ago, walls were
fortified at barracks housing soldiers who operate the Iron Dome batteries
scattered across the south. The only possible explanation for these
fortifications in the form of concrete walls, which separate the batteries and
the barracks, is the concern that someone is planning to target the launching
systems, which are armed with missiles. Such an explosion can cause many
casualties among the soldiers who reside nearby.
An accurate hit on an Iron Dome
battery is one of Hamas's clear objectives, as this isn't merely another
prestigious target, but a symbol—much like infiltration into an Israeli
community, kidnapping a soldier or sabotaging the obstacle Israel is building
on the border. And the simplest way to get to the Iron Dome batteries is by
launching a drone that could drop an explosive on them, or blow up itself.
The drones launched toward that
community in May were likely the "pilot" for an operational plan. To
Hamas, the explosive-carrying drones and the "suicide" drones' main
job is to cause mass casualties or to accurately hit military targets. If
Israel causes mass casualties in the strip, Hamas in response will launch the
explosive drones towards Israeli communities on the Gaza border. It could hit a
basketball court in the middle of a game, or a beach on a hot summer day. In
the Zikim area, for example, several drones from Gaza were found this year.
Another possible scenario is for such a drone to fly over an Israeli sniper
position and drop a small explosive, like a grenade, in response to sniper fire
on Palestinian rioters.
According to data from the
Overland Crossings Authority at the Defense Ministry, in 2016, 110 complete
drones and 51 drone parts were seized at both crossings. In 2017, 70 complete
drones and 301 drone parts were seized. And in 2018 so far, 60 complete drones
and 400 drone parts have been seized. Most of the equipment was purchased
online from companies like AliExpress.
The question is how many drones
weren't captured and were able to get into the strip. The search for the drones
is complicated due to their relatively small size. Normally they are
concealed—in parts or whole—inside the mass amounts of toys going into Gaza,
and at times inside the luggage of a person coming into the strip. In addition,
the route to transport goods from Egypt into Gaza—through the Salah al-Din
crossing near the Rafah crossing—is not under Israeli monitoring, and it has no
information on what comes through it.
The data show that Hamas,
unlike the IDF, considers the smuggling of drones a main effort, just like the
effort to bring in drone parts to the strip. The drone parts get to the
organization's workshops, where professionals put them together and adjust them
for military activity. Inside those workshops, even bigger drones can be built,
which could carry four kilograms and more.
By the way, Hamas
engineer Fadi Albatsh,
who was assassinated in April 2018 in Malaysia, was also working on developing
unmanned aircraft. One of his fields of expertise was encrypted communications
between the operator and the drone.
No comments:
Post a Comment